Why was Montrose executed

James Graham, fifth Earl and first Marquis of Montrose, was executed on 21st May 1650 on Edinburgh's Royal Mile. As Captain-General of all the royal forces in Scotland, a prisoner of Montrose's prestige would usually have had the death sentence carried out by beheading; instead he was hung like a common criminal, his body to be later drawn and quartered. Generally, in Scotland he was regarded as "the most bloody murderer of our nation", and at his trial he was charged with a variety of crimes, including treason and murder. What is puzzling, however, is the fact that by the time of Montrose's trial, the vast majority of public opinion had swung back in favour of the monarchy in the aftermath of Charles' execution the previous year.

News of the regicide had been greeted in Scotland with horror and outrage at this "monstrous parricide", especially as the English had abolished the monarchy without any prior consultation with the other nations governed by Charles. Indeed, the Scots parliament had quickly despatched commissioners to negotiate the coronation of Charles II who was in exile on the continent.

Montrose was the epitome of Royalism itself. So why was he so roundly despised, and why, as a defeated general with no army left to speak of, was his execution so widely clamoured for?

Considering his later glittering campaigns as a Royalist general, one might be surprised to learn that when the Bishops' Wars began in 1637, Montrose began his military career in opposition to the king. He had joined the Covenanters, a pressure-group opposed to Charles' religious innovations which had begun in Scotland in 1634 with the implementation of the English Book of Common Prayer and the Five Articles of Perth. These two measures had sparked fear in Scotland that their religion was becoming anglicised in the case of the former, while being tainted with Catholicism by the latter. This popular unrest soon turned into armed revolt, which later became known as the Bishops' Wars. Montrose acquired his first taste of battle at Brig O'Dee (Aberdeenshire) on 18th June 1639 when he defeated a Royalist army led by James Gordon (ironically a future ally of Montrose) and his affiliated Highland clans. Montrose was vociferous in his defence of the National Covenant and 'the true religion' - so much so, in fact, that Edward Cowan (a recent biographer) describes him as "one of the most outspoken and intransigent of the covenanting leaders".

However this honeymoon period with the Covenanters was destined to be short-lived. Despite a genuine belief in the cause of the Covenant, Montrose remained a committed monarchist at heart. While he could not fully accept Charles' claims of Divine Right and arbitrary rule, and still opposed his religious reforms, Montrose believed that he was simply "participating in an event which might bring the king to his senses". This sentiment turned out to be at odds with the majority hard-line faction within the Covenanter movement. This group, principally led by the Earl of Rothes, Lord Loudon and Montrose's eventual nemesis, Archibald Campbell, Earl (later Duke) of Argyll, were intent on stripping away virtually all of the king's constitutional power.

A revolutionary Edinburgh parliament sat in June 1640, and within nine days acts had been passed which excluded bishops and clergy from parliamentary attendance forever; legislation which came close to a complete disposition of royal authority. Montrose, fearing a Scottish revolution which would clear the way for Argyll and his supporters to grab power, disassociated himself from the Covenanters and entered into correspondence with Charles, offering his services for the Royalist cause. At the same time, he began a campaign against Argyll's party, claiming that they were plotting to establish a dictatorship. He was arrested for his pains in June 1641 and charged with perjury and verbal sedition. He remained in prison until his trial in February 1642, and although he was found guilty of "breaching the Covenant and making divisive motions", a letter of exoneration was issued. An uneasy truce had been concluded between the king and the Covenanters, facilitating the lenient conclusion of the trail. Montrose was a free man but was still determined to campaign for royal authority. When the Covenanters signed the Solemn League and Covenant with the English Parliamentarians and entered the war on Parliament's side, Montrose had no hesitation in obtaining a commission from Charles to fight for the king's cause in Scotland, although remarkably he had yet to recruit an army. As Cowan comments, "in such inauspicious circumstances, with a cause and a commission but lacking a command, the great adventure began".

Given these "inauspicious circumstances", Montrose's run of military triumphs assume an even greater sense of achievement. No less that six victories over the Covenanters were recorded between the Autumns of 1644 and 1645: Tibbermore (Sep 1644); Fyvie (Oct 1644); Inverlochy (Feb 1645); Auldearn (May 1645); Alford (July 1645) and Kilysth (Aug 1645). During this time Montrose acquired an almost monstrous notoriety in the eyes of his enemies. He had turned his back on the Covenant which earned him the reputation as an "opportunist turncoat", but what contributed most of all to his reputation as a "bloody murderer" was his alliance with the Irish warrior Alasdair MacColla, and the use of his Irish troops to reduce the towns and cities of Scotland.

The alliance with Montrose had given MacColla a stage on which he could pursue his main interest which was the settling of ancient scores with Argyll and his Clan Campbell who occupied territory in Scotland which MacColla claimed to be rightfully his. For MacColla, the war against the enemies of Charles Stuart was distinctly subservient to his personal campaign against the Campbells. Many of MacColla's troops were veterans of the Thirty Years War, and were no strangers to the atrocities often carried out during conflicts of a religious nature, as the unfortunate town-dwellers throughout Scotland were to soon find out. In short, as Dr David Stevenson has pointed out, "there was as much religious bigotry on the side of the Irish, as conscious a concept of a holy war, as there was on the part of the Covenanters". Dark rumours of the barbaric Irish had been rife on mainland Britain since the Irish Rebellion on 1641, and the freak weather which coincided with their arrival in Scotland only enhanced this demonic reputation. Once the anti-Campbell Highland clans joined Montrose and the Irish, the stage was set for a Gaelic civil war.

The introduction of Irish veterans gave Montrose an induction in warfare of a new nature, which literally brought home the cruel and bloody consequences of war of a religious nature. The sack of Aberdeen, committed in the aftermath of the Battle of Tibbermore was the first, and probably the most notorious example of Montrose's willingness to resort to "indiscriminate ferocity". The ironic fact that Aberdeen had generally supported Charles up to that point, and the wholesale slaughter of Covenanter and civilian alike has been generally been identified as the nadir of his campaigns for which he was never fully forgiven by either Royalist or Covenanter. Even a sympathetic biographer such as Cowan believed Montrose to be "guilty of one of the most unforgivable atrocities of the Scottish war", and that "on that 'Black Friday', a part of the 'gentle Montrose' perished forever".

The Covenanters, after this massacre and the further five military defeats which followed, eventually got their revenge at the Battle of Philiphaugh in September 1645. Montrose was taken by surprise as he camped around the town of Selkirk, deep in hostile territory. The Covenanter force, led by David Leslie, could hardly contain their glee, nor believe their luck, that after a year of invincibility Montrose had rendered his army virtually defenceless due to a lamentable lack of military intelligence. No quarter was given to the helpless Royalists, and the wholesale slaughter was reminiscent of the fate of Aberdeen almost exactly a year earlier.

Amazingly, Montrose escaped and lived to fight another day. The Covenanters were keen for Charles to accept the Propositions of Newcastle as a means of forging a truce. The Earl of Lanark persuaded his Covenanter colleagues to allow Montrose to flee into exile if the king ordered him to disband. The Covenanters had not succeeded in getting "the lives of these worms chirted out", but when Montrose left for exile in September 1646 at least they had rid themselves of a dangerous enemy who had done so much to damage their cause.

However, he was later to return to haunt them. In February 1649, on hearing that Charles had been executed a couple of weeks earlier, "his grief became passion, his anger was heightened to fury, and his noble spirit was so overwhelmed" that, after first recovering from a dead faint, he vowed to extract a terrible revenge.
He sent this dire warning to the Covenanters:

"I will with all violence and fury, pursue them and kill them as vagabonds, rogues and regicides....not leaving one of their cursed race, if possible, to breathe upon the face of the earth".

After a string of five successive military victories, Montrose had finally been defeated by the Scots Covenenters at Philiphaugh in September 1645. However, the Scots parliament, hopeful of persuading Charles I, currently a 'guest' of the Scots army at Newark, to accept the peace terms known as the 'Propositions of Newcastle', had allowed Montrose to go into exile on the continent if the king agreed to order him to disband. Although the commission of the kirk denounced the treaty for having pardoned many "drunk with the blood, and rich with the spoyles of thousands of our deir brethern", the removal of Montrose was an expedient policy, and was swiftly ratified by Parliament. Despite his defeat at Philiphaugh, Montrose and his followers were still at large and the Covenanters were genuinely afraid of a summer campaign with the joint forces of Montrose, Seaforth, Alasdair MacCholla and the highland clans. The Covenanters had not managed to get "the lives of these worms chirted out", as the Presbyterian Scots minister Robert Baillie had earlier demanded, but when Montrose left for exile in September 1646 at least they had rid themselves of a dangerous enemy who had done so much damage to their cause.

Ironically, public opinion began to gradually swing back in favour of Charles and the monarchy after Montrose's forced departure. This is partly due to the real prospect of peace being restored once Montrose's old army disbanded, and partly due to the traditional deference Scotland had always given her monarchs, a deference which had long been abandoned in more revolutionary England. While England's culture was largely independent of monarchy, a tradition stretching back to the implementation of the Magna Carta which recognised the powers and privileges of parliament, Scotland had traditionally remained largely subservient and compliant to the monarch's prerogative. This fundamental respect for 'God's anointed' perhaps accounts for the growing sympathy towards the king, compounded by a sense of shame by the Scots army's 'sale' of Charles to the English. Once it was no longer necessary to fight Montrose, the Covenanters experienced a conflict among their own ranks. The 'Engagers' emerged as a conservative faction led by Hamilton who were now prepared to accept a settlement with Charles on whatever terms were necessary; while extremists (now known as the 'Kirk party'), led by Argyll, insisted that the king must subscribe to the National Covenant before any further negotiations could continue.

The signing of the Engagement between Charles and the Scots Engagers was concluded by Hamilton's disastrous invasion North England on the king's behalf, and was swiftly ended at Preston. However, this was of extreme significance to the situation in Scotland, for two reasons. Firstly, it brought the prospect of armed conflict back to Scotland; the Whiggamore Raid between pro and anti Engager factions might not have seen the same levels of bloodshed as witnessed during Montrose's campaigns but nevertheless the resumption of Scots killing fellow Scots was certainly an unwelcome development. Secondly it led to the direct intervention of Cromwell's troops in Scotland, and the highly unlikely (although temporary) alliance between the staunchly presbyterian Kirk party and Cromwell's Independents.

The activities of the Engagers had seriously weakened the Kirk party's position, and surely Argyll's intrigue with the Independents was a necessary evil to ensure no further Engager activity surfaced. The Independents might have been "marginally less offensive" to Argyll and the Kirk party than the 'malignant' Engagers who had virtually sacrificed the presbyterian constitution, but they were far from welcome on Scottish soil. Robert Blair, the Scots minister, regarded Cromwell as "an egregious dissembler, and a great liar. Away with him, for he is a greating devil".

The Treaty of Stirling concluded in September 1648 which excluded all Engagers from public office until the following parliament, was a purge of unwelcome members with royalist sympathies. This purge was to be of a similar nature to Pride's Pruge of the Westminster parliament three months later, and gives the illusion of the Kirk party's relative strength. However, the subsequent execution of the king and the creation of the English Republic rudely exposed the fundamental weakness of the Kirk party. Their letters to the English parliament, asserting that both kingdoms had "an unquestionable and undeniable interest in his person as King of both" had simply been ignored. Not only had they had been unable to save the king, they were responsible for his captivity by abandoning him in the first place to the English in February 1647. Public opinion at home was entirely against the execution, which was ominous for the future support of the Kirk party. Lack of support was conspicuous during the Scottish parliamentary session of January to March 1649, when only sixteen nobles took their seats, while in the Highlands there was "widespread unrest and hatred of the Kirk party regime".

Such was their vulnerability that
"when parliament rose the regime...was still isolated, open to invasion by both royalists and English and faced with widespread hostility within Scotland, especially among the nobility".

This then explains the Kirk's dire exposure to a dual threat at the beginning of the Republic, and the subsequent ruthlessness they later displayed with captured royalists. The embarrassing ease with which Cromwell's troops had earlier defeated Hamilton's Engager army, and later occupation of Edinburgh demonstrated that the Scots would be unlikely to be able to do much should republican England decide it could not tolerate a monarchical, presbyterian neighbour to the north. Simultaneously, there still remained a royalist threat. Pluscardine's rising, which seized Inverness in February 1649, was a reminder that Scotland was not yet free from royalist plotting, while Montrose was known to be in touch with the Prince of Wales at Breda.
Montrose had not been idle during his exile. He had continued to campaign for support on the continent, and had remained in close touch with Henrietta Maria, Clarendon and Prince Rupert. His fury at the regicide was incandescent; he raged that Argyll and the Kirk party had conspired to "abolish monarchy, and….to establish an eternal anarchy". When the Scots parliament sent delegates to negotiate terms for proclaiming Charles as king, it must have been somewhat disconcerting not only to find Montrose already there, but discovering that Charles had promised Montrose "not (to) determine any thing, touching the affairs of that kingdom without your advice". Three years after his exile, Montrose's campaigns had not been forgotten, and the commissioners must have been appalled to find Charles prepared to collude with him. Montrose, despite Clarendon's advice to the contrary, had appeared at the Hague where "several Scots such as Lauderdale, who considered that Scotland would never forgive James Graham for the savagery of his campaigns, refused to stand in the same room as him".

The commissioners were shocked into agreeing terms which were vague at best and without Charles having to either disown the Irish Treaty nor sign the Covenants. The alternative of facing a royalist force again led by James Graham was not at all appealing, and in accepting Charles' limited concessions the state commissioners were probably influenced to some extent by fear and uncertainty concerning Montrose's intentions.

Montrose, therefore, represented an obstacle to settlement, just as he was when his troops were embarrassing the delegates to the Westminster Assembly. The limited settlement which was negotiated with the Prince demonstrated just how desperate the Kirk party was to rid themselves of royalists in arms; having their plans thwarted yet again by Montrose reconciled them to the fact that his removal was now the only satisfactory outcome.

Although Charles had signed an agreement with the Scots Parliament, he secretly granted Montrose's request to take an army back to Scotland, via Orkney, to ensure the complete reassertion of royal authority. The last throw of the dice came at Carbisdale on 27th April 1650, and ended with Montrose's second, and final, rout. After escaping the battlefield with his life (most of his troops were not so lucky) he spent two days on the run, disguised as a shepherd, before being captured at Ardvreck castle.

After the crushing defeat at Carbisdale, why was it decided that Montrose should be executed, when after all the atmosphere in Scotland at the time was one of reconciliation with the Stuart monarchy? What better way to cement the relationship with the king presumptive than by granting his most loyal representative favourable justice? Montrose, after his capture, always maintained that he had only been carrying out instructions from Charles, and the most vigorous of Montrose's apologists claim that he was ultimately betrayed by the king himself.

This has not yet been proven either way, and the series of ambiguous instructions and letters from Charles to Montrose between the 3rd and 12th May render the king's true intentions difficult to elucidate. Stevenson maintains that Charles consented to Montrose's final campaign only to use as a threat to force the Kirk party to make further concessions at Breda.

Whatever the final instructions were, Charles' failure to insist from the Scots a clear guarantee for Montrose's safety was indeed "shabby reward" for years of loyal service.

The king's letter to the Scottish parliament stating that he was "heartily sorry that James Graham had invaded this country" and denied being "accessory to the said invasion in the last degree" simply heaped insult onto injury. The king's disassociation with Montrose's actions abdicated his own responsibility for Montrose's safety and handed the Scots free reign to exact their own revenge and punishment on the man who for so long had been their nemesis.

Dr David Stevenson regards the execution as having been carried out in order to present Charles with a fait accompli and therefore escape the need to make any further concessions. This, however implies a cold, detached reason for the execution and completely divorces any emotional motivation from the equation. Montrose's exile had not erased the memories of those who had witnessed some of the atrocities, committed on both sides, during the 'Gaelic civil war', and his return to Scotland when he landed at Caithness invoked all the old terrors. As Montrose's contemporary biographer, George Wishart described,
"The people there, having had some experience of the carriage of his former soldiers,...and their panic being also increased by the dreadful reports...fled away in great numbers...where they gave terrible alarm to the parliament".

Whishart perhaps best describes the new atmosphere of apprehension which was provoked by Montrose's return. A considerable element of his old allies still remained, who "flocked daily out of England great numbers who had escaped from prison" and were "far more numerous" than the army which was keeping the peace. Many had returned to find that their estates had been sequestered, while "being at the same time proceeded against by the hot-headed ministers, desired nothing more than an opportunity for revenge". To the north, there were also the old clans which "would have undoubtedly have come to his assistance, had he not been crushed at his first entry". Wishart was aware of this powder-keg situation, which made Montrose "appear like a prodigious meteor hanging over their heads" and claimed that even as the captured marquis was being transferred to Edinburgh, parliament condemned him in his absence lest he gain even more support en route to his trial. "For they were afraid" Wishart continues, "that the majesty of his appearance...and the fame of his gallant actions, might beget compassion and turn the minds of the people in his favour".

There therefore appear to be four reasons why Montrose was condemned to death. Firstly, according to the Chancellor the Earl of Loudon, he was guilty of a range of crimes, ranging from the breaking of the covenants, invading Scotland "with hostile arms...and calling in the Irish rebels to his assistance". He had committed "many horrible murders, treasons and impieties; for all which God now brought him to suffer condign punishment". Secondly, the Scots were on the verge of a settlement with Charles, but were reluctant to make any further concessions to him.

The king had hoped that fear of a renewed campaign from Montrose would panic the Scots into accepting a less demanding settlement. However, his defeat and abandonment by the king had left Montrose with no friends in authority; a political embarrassment to both sides who represented an obstacle to settlement. Thirdly, although Carbisdale had been a crushing defeat, a royalist presence still existed in Scotland, and in Montrose they had a figurehead who represented a cause still worth fighting for. His removal effectively ended that cause.

Finally there remains the question of revenge. Montrose had remained a thorn in the flesh of the Covenanters almost from the moment he drew up the Cumbernauld band in August 1640, denouncing the National Covenant as subverting the laws of the land. He had exposed the planned triumvirate of Argyll, Hamilton and Leslie, and was a traitor who had joined the king. In the eyes of the Covenanters, the employment of Irish troops to reduce Scotland was unforgivable, as was the slaughter of civilians at Aberdeen in 1644. His consistent run of successes against the Covenanter army had embarrassed the delegates at the Westminster Assembly, and had prevented a satisfactory conclusion to those negotiations.

It is certainly true that "monarchy claimed a martyr in Montrose", and that the execution was, as even Argyll was forced to admit, "the tragik end". The tragic irony which concluded an equally tragic period in Scottish history is that the Scots who had so recently returned to the monarchical fold found it expedient to take the life of one of its most noble and loyal representatives.